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Theories of commitment, altruism and reciprocity have all been invoked to explain and 
describe observed behavior in public goods and social dilemma situations.  In particular, 
commitment theories have been used to explain behaviors like water conservation and voting.  
Theories of altruism are applied in explanation of contributions to charities and 
intergenerational transfers and bequests.  And theories of reciprocity have been invoked to 
explain gift exchange and labor market decisions.  This paper describes a set of experiments 
which distinguish between these competing theories by testing their comparative statics 
predictions in a linear public goods setting.  Results provide strong support for reciprocity 
theories over either theories of commitment or of altruism. 
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1.  Introduction 
 US individuals made over 100 billion dollars of philanthropic contributions in 1995 
(Giving USA, 1996).  This behavior is inconsistent with traditional utility theory in which 
individuals care only for their own consumption.  A number of alternative theories have been 
invoked to explain such philanthropic behavior in this and other settings.  This paper 
describes a set of experiments which distinguish between three competing theories: 
commitment, altruism and reciprocity, by testing their comparative statics predictions in a 
linear public goods setting. 
 In commitment theories, individuals choose the actions they would most prefer 
everyone would choose (Laffont, 1975; Harsanyi, 1980).  Thus they choose the action which 
maximizes their private payoff assuming that everyone else chooses the same action they do.  
Commitment theories are consistent with observed philanthropic behavior, voluntary 
cooperation in social dilemmas like water conservation (Laffont, 1975), tax evasion (Baldry, 
1987), and voting (Struthers and Young, 1989) as well as voluntary contributions to public 
goods. 
 In altruism theories, the consumption of others appears positively as an argument in an 
individual’s utility function (Becker, 1974; Andreoni, 1989, 1990).  Models of altruism are 
also consistent with observed philanthropic behavior and have been used to explain 
intergenerational bequests (Becker, 1974), social security and other welfare systems (Coate, 
1995), and helping behavior in the workplace (Rotemberg, 1994) as well as voluntary 
contributions to public goods. 
 In contrast, Sugden (1984) proposes a theory in which the principle of reciprocity acts 
as a constraint on traditional individual utility maximization.  The principle says (roughly) 
that an individual may not free, cheap or easy ride when others are contributing.  Models of 
reciprocity are also consistent with observed philanthropic behavior (when others are 
contributing) and have been used to explain individual behavior in tax evasion (Bordignon, 
1993), helping in the workplace (Frey, 1993) and labor markets (Akerlof, 1982, 1984; Fehr and 
Gachter, forthcoming) as well as voluntary contributions to public goods. 
 This paper presents four separate experiments designed to distinguish between these 
theories by comparing their comparative statics predictions.  The results of the first 
experiment (presented in section 4) demonstrate a significant and positive relationship between 
an individual's own contribution and his beliefs of the contributions of others in his group, 
consistent with theories of reciprocity and inconsistent with traditional self-interested theories 
or theories of commitment or altruism.  The second and third experiments (presented in 
section 5) test the robustness of the first experiment by comparing an individual’s own 
contributions and the actual contributions of others in his group in different settings.  Similar 
results are generated.  The final experiment (presented in section 6) further investigates the 
specific type of reciprocity our subjects demonstrate.  We find evidence for middle reciprocity, 
where players try to match the middle (or average) contribution of the rest of his group, rather 
than the minimum or maximum. 
 This paper is organized as follows.  Section 2 briefly describes the public goods 
production function and the voluntary contribution mechanism used in this experiment.  
Section 3 outlines the three classes of theories and their implications.  In section 4 we present 
the experiment and results designed to distinguish between the competing theories.  Section 5 
describes two additional experiments designed to test for the robustness of our results.  
Section 6 describes another experiment which investigates individual behavior in more detail.  
Finally, section 7 concludes. 
 
2.  Pure Public Goods and the Voluntary Contribution Mechanism 
 Pure public goods are goods that are both nonrival and nonexcludable.  The 
experiments described in this paper use a linear and pure public good to distinguish between 
our competing hypotheses. The mechanism used to fund the public good is the voluntary 
contribution mechanism which most closely parallels philanthropic giving or contributing 
behavior. This mechanism has been examined extensively in previous literature (see Davis and 
Holt, 1994, chapter 6 and Ledyard, 1995 for complete reviews). 
A.  The Mechanism 
 The mechanism is structured as follows.  Assume each player i in a group of N 
identical players has some endowment Ei which can either be contributed to a group account 
and used to produce units of a public good or can be privately consumed.  Call the amount 
contributed to the group account by i, xi. The individual’s earnings from private consumption is 
simply the amount consumed (Ei- xi).  The individual’s earnings from contributions to the 
group account is a multiple of the sum of contributions by all participants in the group P(iNxi).   
 There is a pure public goods problem whenever <P<1.  When P<1, contributing to the 
public good is never optimal for the self-interested individual.  Contributing one unit to the 
public good earns him only P, and costs him 1.  When <P, contributing to the public good is 
always optimal for the group as a whole.  Contributing one unit to the public good costs an 
individual 1, but earns NP for the group.   
 This mechanism of contributions to the public good in this game is purely voluntary, 
similar to the institution of charitable contributions. 
B.  Related Experiments 
 Marwell and Ames (1979, 1980, 1981) were the first to test public goods provision 
behavior in a linear and pure public good using the voluntary contribution mechanism.  They 
find that when subjects play a one-shot, context-free public goods game they contribute around 
half their endowment to the public good and consume the rest.   
 Later research suggests that when subjects play a the same public goods game finitely 
repeated (with a subgame-perfect equilibrium of full free riding), contributions in the first 
period are similar to those observed in Marwell and Ames, but decrease over time toward the 
free-riding solution (Davis and Holt, 1994; Ledyard, 1995).  Although contributions reach 
their lowest point in the last period of the game, they do not quite reach the equilibrium 
outcome of full free riding. 
 In the first of our experiments, we elicit subjects’ beliefs about the contributions of their 
group and compare those beliefs with their contributing behavior.  Some previous 
experiments have attempted to investigate the relationship between an individual’s belief and 
their actions in public goods settings.  However, most have deceived subjects about the true 
contributions of the other players (e.g. Messick et al., 1983; Schroeder et al., 1983; Poppe and 
Utens, 1986; Fleishman, 1988; Weimann, 1994).  There is also a large literature in 
psychology on belief elicitation and manipulation in prisoners’ dilemma games. 
 In contrast to most of this previous literature, in the experiment presented in this paper, 
no deception is used.  Instead, players’ beliefs of other players’ behavior are elicited and 
compared with the players’ own contributions. 
 
3.  Three Theories and Hypotheses 
 In this section we present three types of theories which have been used to explain 
economic behavior in various settings (including the voluntary provision of public goods) and 
between which we would like to discriminate; commitment, altruism and reciprocity.  In 
particular, we describe the development of each, point to settings in which it has been used and 
describe the comparative statics hypotheses which we will test. 
 In addition to these theories, however, we would like to retain the traditional hypothesis 
of pure self-interest as a benchmark.  This hypothesis posits a utility function in which players 
are concerned only about their own earnings.  In the notation above we have 
 
Ui = (Ei - xi) + Pixi 
 
Whenever  <P<1, then the optimal contribution xi* = 0, and thus xi*/xj = 0 j≠iN. 
When individuals care only about their own payoffs, a pure public goods problem like the one 
our subjects face generates a unique equilibrium in which all players fully free ride (contribute 
zero). In this free riding equilibrium, an individual's contribution is independent of what others 
in the group contribute.  Thus our benchmark free riding hypothesis is that (1) subjects will 
always contribute zero to the public good and (2) (the comparative static prediction) there will 
be no correlation between what an individual contributes and what others in his group 
contribute. 
A.  Commitment Theories 
 Theories of this kind typically rely on Kantian reasoning on the part of individuals.  
These theories then go on to generate behavior which involves (1) positive levels of 
contributions to public goods but also (2) contributions which do not change as the 
contributions of others changes.  Collard (1978, 1983) calls these “Kantian” theories and 
Sugden (1984) refers to the principle underlying this behavior as the “principle of 
unconditional commitment.” 
 Laffont (1975) analyzes the case where individuals believe that others will act as they 
do, then maximize their utility given that belief.  Under these beliefs, he shows that 
individuals voluntarily contribute nonzero amounts toward public goods and social welfare 
increases.  Similarly, Harsanyi (1980) describes the principle of “rational commitment” in 
which an individual takes the action “which will maximize social utility if it is followed by 
everybody in this kind of situation.”  (p. 116).  For our purposes, this implies that individuals 
simply contribute the level she would most prefer that every member of the group would 
contribute (independent of her beliefs).  If everyone behaves according to this principle, the 
argument goes, public goods are funded and social welfare increases. 
 Commitment theories have been used to describe behavior in water conservation 
(Laffont, 1975), lack of littering (Laffont, 1975), tax evasion (Baldry, 1987), voting (Struthers 
and Young, 1989), and other voluntary public goods provision (Bordignon, 1990). 
 Some evidence for these types of norms has been observed in experimental settings.  
For example, Baron and Spranca (1997) demonstrate the existence of “protected values.”  In 
their experiments they identified actions (e.g. free riding) which subjects would simply not do, 
regardless of the (hypothetical) personal gain, or the actions of other subjects. Baldry (1987) 
and Bosco and Mittone (1997) experimentally examine tax evasion, and report a large role 
played by moral constraints in individuals’ behavior. 
 Commitment theories imply that an individual maximizes the utility function 
 
Ui = (Ei - xi) + Pixi 
 subject to his belief that  xi = xj j≠iN 
Integrating the constraint into the objective function yields 
 
Ui = (Ei - xi) + PNxi 
 
Whenever  <P<1, then the optimal contribution xi* > 0, and thus xi*/xj = 0 j≠iN. 
 So commitment theories have two important implications which we can test in a public 
goods setting, yielding the commitment hypothesis.  First, they predict strictly positive (but 
constant) levels of contribution.  Second, (the comparative static prediction) they predict a 
zero correlation between one's contributions and the contributions of others.  In particular, 
under commitment theories each individual chooses the level of contributions which they 
prefer everyone would choose.  As the actual contribution level of others changes, one’s own 
contribution remains stable.  Notice, this is the same comparative static prediction as 
generated by the benchmark theory of self-interest above.  Later in our statistical analyses we 
will look to the absolute level of contributions to distinguish these theories. 
B.  Altruism Theories 
 A second set of theories of altruism assume that individuals care directly about the 
consumption or utility of others.  These theories then go on to generate behavior which 
involves (1) positive levels of contributions to public goods, but also (2) contributions which 
are negatively related to the contributions of others. 
 In Becker (1974) for example, an individual’s utility is defined over not only his own 
consumption, but also the consumption of others (positively in the case of altruism).  Collard 
(1978) distinguishes between this type of altruism, which he calls commodity-related, and 
altruism in which an individual’s utility is defined over his level of consumption and the utility 
of others (positively in the case of altruism), which he calls utility-related. 
 Models of altruism have been influential in explaining economic behavior in many 
settings, including charitable contributions and volunteer behavior (e.g. Unger, 1991; Smith, 
Kehoe and Cremer, 1995), social security and other welfare systems (e.g. Coate, 1995), 
intergenerational bequests and macroeconomic growth (e.g. Rangazas, 1991; Hori, 1992; 
Chakrabarti, Lord and Rangazas, 1993; Strawcyznski, 1994), fertility (e.g. Becker and Barro, 
1988; Tamura, 1994), migration (e.g. Tcha, 1995), safety decisions (Jones-Lee, 1992), 
rent-seeking (Jones, 1996) and behavior in the workplace (e.g. Rotemberg, 1994).  Other 
studies have examined altruism from an evolutionary perspective, either describing 
evolutionary reasons for altruistic preferences or determining the evolutionary outcomes of 
societies with heterogenously altruistic individuals (e.g. Bergstrom and Stark, 1993; 
Haltiwanger and Waldman, 1993; Samuelson, 1993; Bergstrom, 1995). 
 However, recently a number of papers have presented theoretical results which 
challenge theories of altruism (Warr, 1982; Warr, 1983; Roberts 1984; Sugden, 1985; 
Bergstrom et al., 1986; Andreoni 1988a; Bernheim and Stark, 1988) as well as empirical data 
inconsistent with these models.  For example, models of pure altruism imply full “crowding 
out” of both voluntary contributions and subsidies (Warr, 1982; Roberts, 1984; Bernheim, 
1986; Andreoni, 1988a), although there is little evidence of crowding out empirically (Abrams 
and Schitz, 1978; 1984; Clotfelter, 1985) or experimentally (Andreoni, 1993).  Models of 
altruism explaining bequests and inter-vivos transfers have similarly found little support in the 
data (e.g. Cox, 1987; Altonji, Hayashi and Kotlikoff, 1992; Cox and Rank 1992; Hayashi, 1995; 
Laitner and Juster, 1996; Wilhelm, 1996) as have models for charitable giving (e.g. Khanna, 
Posnett and Sandler, 1995). 
 Andreoni (1989, 1990) generalized previous models of altruism to incorporate into an 
individual’s utility function not only the consumption (or welfare) of others, but also the 
“warm glow” of giving (a related paper, Abel and Warshawsky, 1988, discusses the “joy of 
giving” and another, Feldstein, 1975 models a similar process.).  Under this model of impure 
altruism, an individual cares not only about the consumption of others, but also receives some 
private goods benefit from their gift per se.  Andreoni (1990) shows that impure altruism 
implies only partial crowding out, consistent with the empirical results.  Models of impure 
altruism have been used to explain behavior in the supply of charity services by hospitals 
(Frank and Salkever, 1991) and contributions to public goods and charities in general 
(Andreoni, 1989, 1990). 
 A number of experiments have tested for the existence and malleability of (pure or 
impure) altruistic preferences.  Probably the best-known are experiments in the dictator game 
(where one individual is given a sum of money to allocate in any way they wish between 
themselves and another; Camerer and Thaler, 1995 present a review of such experiments).  
Subjects frequently allocate positive amounts to the other player in the game (Forsythe et al., 
1994; Hoffman et al., 1994), and the amounts allocated change with the social distance 
between the players (Hoffman, McCabe and Smith, 1996), the perception of neediness of the 
recipient (Eckel and Grossman, 1996b) and other institutional factors. Altruism has also been 
used to explain experimental behavior in prisoners dilemma games (Andreoni and Miller, 1993; 
Cooper et al., 1996), public goods games (Palfrey and Rosenthal, 1988; Andreoni, 1995), and 
bargaining (Forsythe, Kennan and Sopher, 1991).  
 For purposes of our study, we will test the comparative static predictions of models of 
pure and impure altruism.  Under pure altruism, individuals maximize a utility function which 
includes both their own private consumption and the consumption generated to the group from 
the public good as below 
 
Ui = Ui ([{Ei - xi} + Pixi], PNixi) 
where Ui1 > 0, Ui11 < 0; Ui2 > 0, Ui22 < 0 (both personal consumption and altruistic 
consumption are normal goods with decreasing returns) 
 
Whenever  <P<1, then the optimal contribution xi* > 0.  However, under this assumption 
xi*/xj < 0 j≠iN.  This result is akin to crowding out (see Sugden, 1982, p. 346 for a proof). 
 Under impure altruism, individuals maximize a utility function which includes the 
above as well as the amount they contributed to the public good, as below. 
 
Ui = Ui ([{Ei - xi} + Pixi], PNixi, xi)  
where Ui1 > 0, Ui11 < 0; Ui2 > 0, Ui22 < 0; Ui3 > 0, Ui33 < 0 (personal consumption, altruistic 
consumption and warm glow consumption are normal goods with decreasing returns) 
 
Again, whenever  <P<1, then the optimal contribution xi* > 0.  Also under this assumption, 
xi*/xj < 0 j≠iN.  This result is akin to partial crowding out; an increase in the amount of the 
public good provided implies a decrease in an individual’s own contribution, although the 
decrease is smaller than under pure altruism (see Andreoni, 1989, p. 1451 for a proof).  Thus 
our comparative static prediction from both types of theories of altruism (the altruism 
hypothesis) is that there will be a negative relationship between an individual's own 
contribution and (his beliefs about) the contributions of others in his group. 
C.  Reciprocity Theories 
 A final set of theories of reciprocity assume that individuals reciprocate or match the 
contributions of others.  These theories then go on to generate behavior which involves (1) 
positive levels of contributions to public goods, but also (2) contributions which are positively 
related to the contributions of others. 
 Sugden (1984) describes a model in which individuals profit-maximize subject to an 
external constraint; the principle of reciprocity.  This principle says that an individual must 
contribute the minimum of (1) the least any other member of his group is contributing and (2) 
the level of contribution he would most prefer that every member of the group make (the same 
as the level of contributions he would make under commitment theories).  By assuming this 
principle as a constraint on behavior, Sugden derives the existence of (multiple) equilibria in 
settings of both identical and nonidentical players.   
 Reciprocal reasoning has been used to explain empirically observed individual behavior 
in tax evasion (Bordignon, 1993), gift exchange (Solow, 1994; Kranton, 1996), public goods 
provision (Hollander, 1990), helping in the workplace (Frey, 1993), joint ventures (Kogut, 
1989), and labor markets (Akerlof, 1982, 1984; Fehr and Gachter, forthcoming). 
 A number of experiments have reported behavior consistent with reciprocity as well.  
In experimental labor markets, subjects playing the role of firms offer efficiency wages and 
subjects playing the role of workers respond reciprocally by offering more effort than is 
individually rational (Fehr, Kirchsteiger and Riedl, 1996; Fehr and Tougareva, 1996; Fehr and 
Tyran, 1996; Kirchler, Fehr and Evans, 1996; Fehr, Gachter and Kirchsteiger, 1997; Gachter 
and Falk, 1997; Fehr, Kirchsteiger and Riedl, 1998).  A similar result was found in 
experimental goods markets (Fehr, Kirchsteiger and Riedl, 1993).  Reciprocal behavior was 
also found in experimental bargaining games like the trust game (Berg, Dickhaut and McCabe, 
1995; Van Huyck, Battalio and Walters, 1995; Jacobsen and Sadreih, 1996; Abbink, Irlenbusch 
and Renner, 1997; Guth, Ockenfels and Wendel, 1997; Buchan, Johnson and Croson, 1998) 
and the common pool resource public goods game (Messick et al., 1983; Schroeder et al., 1983; 
Poppe and Utens, 1986; Wade-Benzoni, Tenbrunsel and Bazerman, 1996).  Other 
bargaining-type experimental games have also exhibited evidence of reciprocity (Bolton, 
Brandts and Katok, 1996; Bolton, Brandts and Ockenfels, 1997). 
 For purposes of our study, we will test the comparative static predictions of models of 
reciprocity, which predict a significant positive relationship between an individual’s 
contributions to the public good and those of his group.  In our notation, under this theory an 
individual maximizes his personal utility as below 
 
Ui = (Ei - xi) + Pixi 
 subject to xi ≥ min (xic, xj jN) 
 where xic is the optimal level of contribution under commitment theories 
 
Whenever <P<1, then the optimal contribution xi* > 0.  However, under this assumption in 
equilibria it can be that xi*/xj > 0 j≠iN.  See Result 4 (p. 780) of Sugden (1984) for a proof.  
This theory is thus consistent with a positive correlation between one's own contribution and 
the contribution of other members of the group; this prediction will be our reciprocity 
hypothesis.  
 It is worth noting that Sugden’s model of reciprocity is a model of simultaneous (not 
sequential) matching of contributions.  Players in this game do not wait to see what others 
have contributed, and then reciprocate their contributions.  Instead, everyone makes 
contributions at the same time, maximizing their self-interest subject to the principle of 
reciprocity and given their beliefs of others’ contributions.  Thus our test of this theory of 
reciprocity will (of necessity) be a simultaneous one. 
D.  Summary 
 The experiments reported in this paper allow us to discriminate between the 
comparative statics of three classes of theories of behavior, all of which have been invoked to 
explain the voluntary provision of public goods.  The first class of theories (commitment rules) 
predicts no correlation between an individual's contribution and the contributions of others, or 
his beliefs about them (a similar zero correlation is predicted by traditional theories of full free 
riding).  The second class of theories (pure and impure altruism) predicts a negative 
correlation.  Finally the third class of theories (reciprocity) predicts a positive correlation. 
 It should be noted that all these models are models of one-shot behavior.  In 
experiments, however, subjects seldom play equilibria on their first try.  Rather, they adjust 
their behavior and converge toward equilibria.  In order to give these equilibria their best 
chance, the experimental design involves two 10-fold repetitions of a public goods game 
(consistent with previous experiments, Davis and Holt, 1994; Ledyard, 1995).  Since the 
equilibria described above are equilibria of the stage game, they are also equilibria of the 
finitely repeated game (Smith, 1990). 
 Sections 4, 5 and 6 below present the experiments which distinguish between these 
different theories. 
 
4.  Study I:  Comparing Contributions with Estimated Contributions of Others 
 This study tests the comparative static predictions of models of commitment, altruism 
and reciprocity by comparing an individual’s contribution with his belief about the contribution 
of others.  Subjects play a finitely repeated linear public goods game.  Before each period, 
they are asked to estimate the contributions of the other members of their group.  The first 
subsection describes the experimental design and parameters, the second discusses results 
investigating the comparative statics of behavior and the third addresses the accuracy of 
subjects’ beliefs.  The fourth subsection concludes. 
A.  Experimental Design and Parameters 
 This experiment was designed to replicate previous experiments in finitely repeated 
linear public goods games as closely as possible (Davis and Holt, 1994; Ledyard, 1995).  The 
same structure of game and parameter values as in previous experiments were used. 
 In each period of the game, each subject was endowed with 25 tokens which could be 
allocated either to a private account, which paid 2¢  per token to the individual only, or to a 
group account (the public good), which paid 1¢  per token to each of the four members of the 
individual’s group.  Notice that each period of this experiment incorporates a pure public 
goods problem.  Under traditional assumptions of self-interest, regardless of the decisions of 
the other players, each individual strictly prefers to place all of his tokens in his private account, 
earning 2¢  per token, than in the group account, earning 1¢  per token.  However the group 
as a whole earns 4¢  when a token is placed in the group account (1¢  to each of the four 
members) but only earns 2¢  when the token is placed in a private account.  This yields an 
MPCR of .5, similar to that in previous papers (Davis and Holt, 1994; Ledyard, 1995). 
 In a departure from previous experiments, each period of the game was divided into 
two stages; the “guessing” and the “decision” stage.  In the guessing stage, subjects estimated 
the total number of tokens the other three members of their group would contribute to the 
group account in the upcoming decision stage.   They were compensated for accurate 
estimates.  In the decision stage, subjects made their personal and private contribution 
decisions, as in previous experiments. 
 At the end of each period, subjects were reminded of their own estimate, told the true 
aggregate contribution of the other three members of group, the total group contribution and 
their earnings from both the estimation stage and the contribution stage. 
 Subjects played two identical ten-period linear public goods games.  Subjects played 
the first game, and then were told there was enough time to play a second (as in Andreoni, 
1988b).  The second game was always identical to the first. 
 Twenty-four subjects arranged in six groups of four participated in this experiment.  
Subjects were undergraduate students at the University of Arizona summer session.  They 
were paid a five dollar show-up fee along with their earnings in the experiment.  Average 
earnings were $14.69, plus the $5 fee, for less than an hour of experimental time.  The entire 
experiment was computerized; instructions were given through the computer screen, subjects 
entered their contributions via the keyboard and, at the end of each period, feedback about the 
outcome was displayed on the screen.  Subjects could also access a “history” of past 
outcomes of their group at any time. 
 In the following subsections we directly test the comparative statics of commitment, 
altruism and reciprocity theories by investigating the relationship between an individual’s 
beliefs of what others will contribute and his own contributions.  Commitment theories 
predict a zero correlation, altruism theories a negative correlation and reciprocity theories a 
positive correlation. 
B.  Results:  Testing Comparative Statics 
1.  Overall 
 A random effects regression as below compares an individual's contribution with his 
belief of what the rest of his group will contribute. 
 CONTit = 0 + 1GUESSt + 2PERIOD + i≠1iIND + i 
 
The dependent variable is an individual i’s contribution to the public good in period t. 
Independent variables are the individual's GUESS of what the other three members of his 
group will contribute in this same period t, the PERIOD number, and an indicator variable for 
each individual (IND).  A random effects regression not only allows for individual-specific 
intercepts (from the indicator variables) but also individual-specific error terms.  For a 
complete discussion of random effects regression see Greene, 1990.  Results of the regression 
are reported in Table 1, parameter estimates for individual dummies are suppressed for ease of 
presentation. 
_______________________________________________________________________ 
Insert Table 1 about here 
_______________________________________________________________________ 
 
 This regression reports a significant positive relationship between a subject's guess of 
what the other three members of his group will contribute and his own contribution.  This 
result strongly supports reciprocity theories over theories of commitment (which predicted a 
zero correlation) and altruism (which predicted a negative correlation). 
 The intercept in this regression was also positive, consistent with previous experimental 
results that subjects make positive contributions in similar games (Davis and Holt, 1994; 
Ledyard, 1995).  The coefficient on period is not significant. 
 Identical regressions using only the data from the first game (the first 10 periods) or the 
second game (the second 10 periods) yield similar results, reported in Table 2. 
_______________________________________________________________________ 
Insert Table 2 about here 
_______________________________________________________________________ 
 
 The intercept and GUESS coefficient is similarly positive and significant in each 
individual game.  The PERIOD coefficient is significantly negative in the first game, 
suggesting declining contributions over time, also observed in previous experiments, (Davis 
and Holt, 1994; Ledyard, 1995).  However, by the second game contributions appear to have 
stabilized and no decrease is observed. 
 While these analyses examine the correlation between contributions and beliefs over 
time, alternatively, we can investigate the between-subject correlation between contributions 
and beliefs in only the first or only the last periods of the game.  To do this, we estimate the 
following random effects OLS regression 
 
CONTit = 0 + 1GUESSt + i≠1iIND + i 
 
separately for only period 1 and only period 10.  Table 3 provides results from these 
regressions. 
_______________________________________________________________________ 
Insert Table 3 about here 
_______________________________________________________________________ 
 
 Again, consistent with the reciprocity model, we find a significantly positive 
relationship between an individual’s contributions and his estimates of others’ contributions.  
In addition, we observe positive (but highly variable) contributions in period 1 of the game, 
and significantly lower contributions in period 10 of the games, consistent with previous 
experiments  in this area which document decreasing contributions over time (Davis and Holt, 
1994; Ledyard, 1995). 
2.  Individual Characterizations 
 A second type of analysis characterizes the behavior of individual subjects in the 
experiment.  For each of the 24 subjects, we calculate the correlation between their 
contribution and their belief of the contribution of others in their group.  In this way, we can 
identify individual subjects whose behavior is consistent with comparative statics of 
commitment, altruism or reciprocity models.  Table 4 depicts the results from this analysis.   
______________________________________________________________________ 
Insert Table 4 about here 
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 Twenty-two out of 24 subjects (almost 92%) exhibit a positive correlation between 
their own contribution and their estimates of the contributions of others, consistent with models 
of reciprocity.  Only two subjects exhibit a negative correlation, consistent with models of 
altruism, and none a zero correlation, consistent with models of commitment. 
 These results represent a statistically significant difference from random behavior.  A 
chi-squared test comparing the actual categorization of subjects against a null hypothesis of 
equal probability of all three types, rejects the null at p<.01. 
C.  Results:  Estimate Accuracy 
 In this experiment, each subject estimated what others in his group would contribute.  
One important question involves the accuracy of these estimates. 
 Figure 1 shows the average absolute estimation error made by each group in each 
period of the game.  This error is calculated by computing the absolute error of each subject 
in each period (the distance between their guess and the other three subjects’ actual 
contributions) and averaging within each group.  If all subjects were extremely bad guessers 
this average absolute estimation error could be as high as 25.  Instead subjects appear to be 
fairly accurate in their estimations of others’ behavior. 
______________________________________________________________________ 
Insert Figure 1 about here 
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 We can define an individual subject’s estimation error as the difference between that 
subject’s estimate and the actual contributions of the other members of his group.  Over all 
ten rounds of the first game, only eight out of 24 subjects exhibited any significantly positive 
levels of error (overoptimism).  In the second game, no subjects exhibited significant levels of 
error.  Throughout the experiment, most subjects provided unbiased guesses of what their 
counterparts in the public goods game will do. 
D.  Conclusion 
 This study was designed to provide data which could distinguish between models of 
commitment, altruism and reciprocity by comparing their comparative static predictions.  In 
particular, we compare an individual’s contribution in a public goods game with his beliefs 
about the contributions of others.  Results from a random effects regression demonstrate a 
significant positive relationship, consistent with models of reciprocity and inconsistent with 
models of commitment or altruism.  In addition, an analysis at the level of individual subject 
is run.  Almost 92% of the subjects (22 out of 24) demonstrate a positive correlation between 
their own contributions and their beliefs of others contributions, consistent with reciprocity 
models.  The remaining 8% exhibit a negative correlation, consistent with models of altruism 
and none exhibit a zero correlation, consistent with models of commitment and of traditional 
self-interest models. 
 In addition, we provide an analysis of the accuracy of subjects’ beliefs in this setting.  
We find that subjects’ beliefs are quite accurate.  In the first game, only eight subjects out of 
24 had significantly positive levels of error; in the second game no subjects did. 
 Although these results appear encouraging for reciprocity models, a few questions 
remain.  First, it may be that asking subjects for their estimates of others’ actions leads them 
to think reciprocally where they wouldn’t otherwise (an elicitation hypothesis).  Second, it 
may be that the repeated game nature of this experiment is yielding the positive correlation and 
not reciprocity per se (a reputation hypothesis). 
 To answer these questions and test the robustness of our results, two more experiments 
were run and the comparative static predictions of our models re-analyzed.  Neither of the 
experiments involved the elicitation of beliefs of others’ actions.  Instead, we compare an 
individual’s contribution with the actual contribution of the other members of his group.  
Since in this experiment, subjects’ elicited beliefs were quite accurate, we claim the 
comparative static predictions from the models will transfer to this new context.  The next 
section describes the new experiments and their results. 
 
5.  Study II:  Comparing Contributions with Actual Contributions of Others 
A..  Testing the Elicitation Hypothesis 
 Our first question involves the extent to which asking subjects to estimate the 
contributions of others leads them to play reciprocally where they wouldn’t otherwise.  To 
test this hypothesis, we ran a new experiment, identical to the first but excluding the estimation 
stage.  Twenty-four subjects, different from the previous subjects but from the same subject 
pool, participated in this experiment, arranged in six groups of four.  Average earnings for 
this experiment were $13.91 (plus the $5 show-up fee) for less than one hour of experimental 
time. 
 Here, we are interested in the correlation between subjects’ contribution and the 
ACTUAL total contribution of others in this same period (unfortunately, we can’t compare an 
individual’s contribution with his belief about the contributions of others when those beliefs 
are not elicited).  A zero correlation is predicted by commitment theories, a negative 
correlation by altruism theories and a positive correlation by reciprocity theories.  With this 
data, we estimate the random effects OLS regression 
 
CONTit = 0 + 1ACTUALt + 2PERIOD + i≠1iIND + i 
 
for both the previous experiment and this one.  Results from these regressions are reported in 
Table 5, below. 
______________________________________________________________________ 
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 Consistent with the reciprocity hypothesis, a significant positive relationship is found 
between an individual’s contribution and the actual contribution of others in both the previous 
experiment (Guess) and this experiment (No Guess).  First, focusing on the previous 
experiment, this relationship is a bit less strong than the relationship between an individual’s 
contribution and estimate of others’ contributions (where the coefficient was .202 rather 
than .164).  The relationship appears somewhat weaker in this experiment (.077 versus .164), 
nonetheless it is still significant at the 1% level. 
 Interestingly, subjects contributed on average significantly less in the previous 
experiment (when they were asked to estimate the contributions of others) than in this one, as 
can be seen by the difference in intercept between the two regressions.  This difference is 
explored in more detail in a related paper, Croson (1997).  Finally, both regressions show a 
significant decrease in contributions over the course of the games, consistent with evidence 
from previous experiments (Davis and Holt, 1994; Ledyard, 1995). 
 In a parallel to our first analysis, we can also compare within an individual, their 
correlation between their contributions and the actual contributions of others in their group.  
Table 6 provides those results for the previous experiment and this experiment. 
______________________________________________________________________ 
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 In the previous experiment (Guess), 21 out of 24 subjects (87.5%) exhibited a positive 
correlation between their own contribution and the actual contributions of others in their group, 
consistent with reciprocity theories.  Only 3 subjects exhibited a negative correlation, 
consistent with altruism theories and no subjects exhibited a zero correlation.  The pattern in 
this experiment (No Guess) is similar, 19 out of 24 subject exhibited a positive correlation 
(79%), only 5 a negative correlation and none exhibited a zero correlation.  These results 
represent a statistically significant difference from random behavior.  A chi-squared test 
comparing the actual categorization of subjects against a null hypothesis of equal probability of 
all three types, rejects the null at p<.01, for each experiment independently as well as for both 
of them together. 
 While there are some differences in the level of contributions between games in which 
estimates of others’ contributions are elicited and where they are not, results from this 
subsection demonstrate that the comparative statics of reciprocity theories remain most 
consistent with the data, even when beliefs are not elicited.  This allows us to reject the 
elicitation hypothesis. 
B.  Testing the Reputation Hypothesis 
 A further concern is that the positive correlation observed is arising from some sort of 
reputation development rather than from reciprocity.  In both our original experiment and the 
second experiment presented above, subjects were formed into groups which remained 
constant for the duration of the experiment.  This matching procedure is by far the most 
common one used in previous experiments (Davis and Holt, 1994; Ledyard, 1995).  However, 
in this setting it may be another cause of our results.   For example, if all subjects were 
playing in a way consistent with Kreps et al. (1986), and all subjects believed all subjects were 
playing in this way, we might observe a positive correlation similar to the one we observed, but 
for reputational rather than reciprocal reasons.  The experiment reported in this subsection 
was designed to test this alternative explanation. 
 A different 24 subjects participated in this experiment (Strangers).  The experiment 
was run in two separate sessions of 12 subjects each.  Subjects played the same game as in the 
previous experiments.  After each period of the game, however, subjects were randomly 
reassigned to new groups of four (as in Andreoni, 1988b; Croson, 1996; van Winden and Keser, 
1997).  Thus it was extremely unlikely a subject would play with the same group of three 
other people more than once during the session.  This type of matching scheme has been 
demonstrated to reduce reputation effects (for an explanation of why, see Andreoni, 1988b).  
Average earnings for this experiment were $11.83 (plus the $5 show-up fee) for less than one 
hour of experimental time. 
 Here, we are again interested in the correlation between subjects’ contribution and the 
ACTUAL total contribution of others with whom he is matched in this same period.  If the 
previously-observed positive correlation is being caused by reputational issues (the reputation 
hypothesis) we should observe a zero correlation in this experiment.  Thus, with this data, we 
estimate the random effects regression 
 
CONTit = 0 + 1ACTUALt + 2PERIOD + i≠1iIND + i 
 for this experiment.  Results from these regressions are reported in Table 7, below. 
______________________________________________________________________ 
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 Consistent with the reciprocity hypothesis, a significant positive relationship is found 
between an individual’s contribution and the actual contribution of others in this experiment as 
well.  Although the relationship appears somewhat weaker in this experiment than in previous 
ones (suggesting some reputation formation may be going on), nonetheless it is still significant 
at the 1% level, supporting theories of reciprocity over those of commitment or altruism. 
 In similar analysis to that above, we also compare, within an individual, the correlation 
between their contributions and the actual contributions of others in their group.  Table 8 
provides those results for this experiment. 
______________________________________________________________________ 
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 As in previous experiments, most of the subjects exhibited positive correlations 
between their own contributions and contributions of others, consistent with reciprocity 
theories (almost 71%).  Only three out of 24 subjects exhibited negative correlations, 
consistent with altruism theories.  In contrast to previous experiments, however, four subjects 
exhibited zero correlations between their own contributions and the contributions of others.  
Closer inspection reveals that these correlations were generated by four subjects who fully free 
rode (contributed zero) throughout the entire experiment.  This result of more free riding and 
lower contributions in strangers experiments than among stable groups is consistent with 
previous research (Croson, 1996; van Winden and Keser, 1997).  
 These results represent a statistically significant difference from random behavior.  A 
chi-squared test comparing the actual categorization of subjects against a null hypothesis of 
equal probability of all three types, rejects the null at p<.01. 
 While there are more free riders and lower contributions in this experiment than in 
previous ones, results are still supportive of the comparative statics of reciprocity theories over 
those of commitment or altruism.  A significant and positive relationship is found between an 
individual’s contribution and the contribution of others in his group. 
C.  Conclusion 
 In this section we presented the results of two further experiments, which test the 
robustness of our previous result.  The first demonstrates a positive relationship between an 
individual’s contribution and the contributions of others even when beliefs are not elicited.  
The second demonstrates a similarly positive relationship even when reputational concerns are 
severely reduced.  We conclude that reciprocal concerns in this setting are robust.  Having 
demonstrated support for theories of reciprocity in three different settings, we now turn to 
Study III, which provides a characterization of the type of reciprocity individuals exhibit.   
 
6.  Study III:  Types of Reciprocity 
 In Sugden’s (1984) model of reciprocity, he suggests that actors will match the 
minimum contribution of others.  In contrast, however, we can imagine different types of 
reciprocity in which subjects try to match the average contribution of others, or possibly even 
the maximum.  The experiment reported in this study distinguishes between these different 
specifications of reciprocity. 
A.  Experimental Design and Parameters 
 Twenty-four subjects, distinct from previous participants but from the same subject 
pool, participated in this experiment.  Subjects were arranged into groups of four and played 
two ten-round games retaining the same groups.  All parameter values were the same as in the 
previous experiments, and no elicitation of beliefs was made. 
 In contrast to the previous experiments, however, after each period subjects were 
informed not only of the aggregate contribution of the other three members of their group, but 
also of the individual contributions of the other three members of the group (as in Sell and 
Wilson, 1991; Croson, forthcoming).  Thus subjects could attempt to match either the 
maximum, the minimum or the middle contribution.  As before, subjects took home their 
earnings from the experiment (average $14.03) plus their $5 show-up-fee. 
B.  Results:  Testing Comparative Statics 
 In this experiment we again observe a positive relationship between an individual’s 
own contribution and the actual contribution of others in their group. With this data, we again 
estimate the random effects OLS regression 
 
CONTit = 0 + 1ACTUALt + 2PERIOD + i≠1iIND + i 
 
Results from this regression are shown in Table 9, below. 
______________________________________________________________________ 
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 As before, we observe a significantly positive relationship between one’s own 
contribution and the actual contributions of others in one’s group.  The intercept is 
significantly positive, and the period variable significantly negative, consistent with results 
from previous experiments (Davis and Holt, 1994; Ledyard, 1995). 
 A parallel analysis as above involving correlations at the individual level also yields 
similar results, as shown in Table 10. 
______________________________________________________________________ 
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 Almost 88% (21 subjects out of 24) exhibit a positive correlation, consistent with 
theories of reciprocity.  Only two subjects out of 24 (8.33%), exhibit a negative correlation, 
consistent with theories of altruism.  One subject’s behavior yields a zero correlation, closer 
inspection shows that subject contributes nothing throughout the entire experiment.  Thus we 
classify him as a free rider. These results represent a statistically significant difference from 
random behavior.  A chi-squared test comparing the actual categorization of subjects against a 
null hypothesis of equal probability of all three types, rejects the null at p<.01. 
 This experiment demonstrates similar evidence in favor of theories of reciprocity as 
previous ones.  In addition, however, we can use the data to compare between different types 
of reciprocity.  This is done in the next subsection. 
C.  Different Types of Reciprocity 
 This data allows us to compare three different types of reciprocity: maximum, 
minimum and middle.  In maximum reciprocity, subjects would attempt to match the 
maximum contribution of the other three members of their group.  In minimum reciprocity, 
subjects would attempt to match the minimum contribution of the other three members of their 
group.  Finally, in middle reciprocity, subjects would attempt to match the contributions of 
the middle contributor of the other three members of their group. 
 Our goal is to determine which of these three models of reciprocity best fits the data.  
That is, which of the minimum, maximum or middle contribution of an individual’s partners 
better predicts an individual’s own contribution.  We estimate four random effect OLS 
regressions, as below 
 
CONTit = 0 + 1MINt + 2PERIOD + i≠1iIND + i 
CONTit = 0 + 1MAXt + 2PERIOD + i≠1iIND + i 
CONTit = 0 + 1MIDt + 2PERIOD + i≠1iIND + i 
CONTit = 0 + 1MINt + 2MAXt + 3MIDt + 4PERIOD + i≠1iIND + i 
 
Results from these regressions are shown in Table 11. 
______________________________________________________________________ 
Insert Table 11 about here 
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 Evidence from these regressions suggests that middle reciprocity is a better predictor 
than either minimum or maximum reciprocity.  First, in the individual regressions (1), (2) and 
(3), the t-statistic is higher for the middle contribution than for either of the others.  In 
addition, in the regression which includes all measures (4), only middle is significantly 
different than zero.  This suggests that the middle contribution of the others in a subject’s 
group is a better predictor of that subject’s own contribution than either the maximum or the 
minimum.  In all of these regressions we observe a similar result as above of significantly 
positive contributions (positive intercept coefficient) which decrease over time (negative 
PERIOD coefficient) as in previous studies (Davis and Holt, 1994; Ledyard, 1995). 
 Another way to demonstrate this relationship is through a standardized regression.  
Here, the same regression equations are run as above, except the independent measures (MIN, 
MAX and MID) are standardized to be distributed normally with mean zero and variance one.  
In these regressions, the absolute size of the coefficients can be compared directly.  Results 
from the standardized random effects OLS regressions are shown in Table 12. 
______________________________________________________________________ 
Insert Table 12 about here 
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 Again, we see that the middle contribution of the other players is a better predictor of a 
subject’s own contribution than either the maximum or the minimum.  The standardized 
coefficient on MID is higher than either of the other two, and in the final regression (4), only 
MID remains significantly different than zero.  And again we observe significantly positive 
contributions (positive intercept coefficient) which decrease over time (negative PERIOD 
coefficient) as in previous studies (Davis and Holt, 1994; Ledyard, 1995). 
D.  Conclusion 
 This experiment sheds light on exactly what subjects in this experiment might be trying 
to reciprocate.  First, our results are consistent with the comparative statics of reciprocity 
theories in yet another setting, this time where subjects are given information about the full 
distribution of their group’s contributions, not just the total.  Then, we test whether the 
minimum, maximum or middle contribution of the other three players is a better predictor of a 
subject’s own contribution.  We find significant evidence for middle reciprocity, suggesting 
that subjects try to match the median or average contributions of others, rather than the 
minimum (as suggested by Sugden’s theory of reciprocity) or the maximum. 
 
7.  Discussion and Conclusion 
 The experiments reported in this paper tested comparative statics predictions of three 
models consistent with observations of voluntary public goods provision; commitment, 
altruism and reciprocity.  The results support the reciprocity model in which individual 
contributions are positively related to the contributions of others, or to their beliefs about those 
contributions. 
 Reciprocal behavior is also supported by anecdotal evidence.  Charities eliciting 
contributions often suggest a particular level as the "standard" gift or report the size of their 
"average" contribution.  Presumably this influences individual's beliefs of what others are 
giving, thus causing them to give more. 
 Even the very wealthy seem to exhibit reciprocal behavior, in this example from Forbes 
Magazine, "Seattle's Lakeside Upper School counts ... Bill Gates among its alumni.  Rumor 
has it a fundraiser for the high school put the bite on Gates, who asked: ‘How much is 
everyone else giving?’  About $75 he was told.  ‘So put me down for $75,’ said Gates.”  
(January 22, 1996, p. 18). 
 While middle-matching behavior like this is consistent with the reciprocity principle, it 
may be adaptively rational as well.  Societies whose members follow this principle are more 
likely to be able to supply public goods than societies whose members practice self-interest 
utility maximization.  One can also imagine an individually rational reason to behave 
reciprocally.  If the quality or reliability of charitable groups are not known, individual 
contributors may use the contributions of others as a signal for how much they should 
contribute themselves (as in Vesterlund, 1998). 
 This study examines the factors that motivate individuals to make voluntary 
contributions in social dilemma situations.  In particular, it finds support for reciprocity 
theories over commitment theories, altruistic theories and traditional free-riding theories.  We 
find a significant and positive relationship between an individual’s contribution and his belief 
about the contributions of others in his group, as well as between an individual’s contribution 
and the actual contributions of the others in his group.  These results suggest that players act 
as though part of their objective is to match the contributions of other members. 
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The actual amount contributed by individuals in 1995 was $116,230,000,000.  This number 
excludes charitable giving by corporations, foundations and bequests. 
 
That is, multiple agents can consume the good at the same time (nonrival) and it is not possible 
to exclude agents who did not pay for the good from consuming it (nonexcludable).   
 
The multiple P is often called the marginal per capita return (MPCR) and is the marginal return 
to each individual on a contribution of one unit to the group account (Isaac and Walker, 1988a). 
 
Other studies using this mechanism have examined the effect of relative payoffs (Isaac and 
Walker, 1988a) communication (Isaac and Walker, 1988b, 1991; Wilson and Sell, 1997), 
culture (Burlando and Hey, 1997), reputation and learning (Andreoni, 1988b; Weimann, 
1994; Croson, 1996; van Winden and Keser, 1997), random noise (Andreoni, 1995; Palfrey 
and Prisbrey, 1996), payments (Sefton and Steinberg, 1996), spite (Saijo and Nakamura, 
1995), group size (Isaac, Walker and Williams, 1994), discreteness of the public good (Asch, 
Gigliotti and Polito, 1993), and information (Sell and Wilson, 1991; Croson, forthcoming), as 
well as many other issues. 
 
A similar technique of belief elicitation has been used in public goods games in a slightly 
different context.  In these studies, voluntary contribution mechanisms are run which have 
interior Nash equilibria (rather than a boundary equilibrium).  Authors then elicit subjects’ 
beliefs about others’ behavior and categorizes subjects based on whether they play best 
responses to their own beliefs (see e.g. Isaac and Walker, 1992; Dudley 1993; Offerman, 
Sonnemans and Schram, 1996; Suleiman and Rapoport, 1992; Rapoport and Eshed-Levy, 1989; 
Rapoport and Suleiman, 1993; ). 
 
More recent work in philosophy (e.g. Gibbard and Harper, 1988; Lewis, 1988; Nozick, 1990) 
and psychology (e.g. nonconsequential reasoning of Shafir and Tversky, 1993 and Tversky and 
Shafir, 1992) suggests that these sorts of misperceptions of causality both can be and are used to 
solve many social and individual decision problems. 
 
Laffont (1975) also discusses the social benefits of a government convincing the population that 
this belief is true. 
 
In fact, in this linear case, xi* = Ei, 
 
 Both Collard (1978) and Becker (1974) show that altruism need not lead to an infinite 
explosion of utility between multiple altruistic individuals as long as an individual’s own 
utility (or consumption) is more important to him than anothers’. 
 
That is, each dollar increase in government grants should result in a dollar decrease in private 
giving. 
 
A number of interesting experimental studies have investigated gender differences in altruistic 
preferences with different results.  Bolton and Katok (1995) showed no significant differences 
while other studies (Andreoni and Vesterlund, 1997; Eckel and Grossman, 1996a; Brown-Kruse 
and Hummels, 1993) demonstrate significant differences. 
 
Other theories of altruism also predict this negative correlation (e.g. Arrow, 1975; Sen, 1977; 
Roberts, 1984, 1987; Posnett and Sandler, 1986; Margolis, 1982; Schwartz, 1970; Hood, Martin 
and Osberg, 1977; Collard, 1978). 
 
It is worth noting that such a positive correlation has been assumed in theories of voluntary 
activities (e.g. Cornes and Sandler, 1984). 
 
Because they estimated the contributions of the other three members of the group, subjects could 
not influence the accuracy of their guess by strategically changing their own contribution. 
 
In addition to their earnings from the public good, subjects earned 50¢  if their estimate was 
exactly right.  If their estimate was a bit off, they earned 25¢  divided by the (absolute) 
distance between their estimate and the true contribution. This payment scheme leads to an 
approximation of a single-peaked curve. 
 
Croson (1997) compares contributing behavior between this treatment and a traditional linear 
public goods experiment treatment. 
 
In addition there were three practice periods before the first game began to familiarize subjects 
with the computer program and the process.  Subjects were not paid their earnings during the 
practice periods and no practice periods were run before the second game.  Raw data as well as 
the instructions used are available from the author.  
 
The same regression including dummy variables for each group had similar results, as did one 
including dummies for the period numbers and a two-factor random effects regression 
(individual and period). 
 
 Notice we have two observations for each individual, one for period 1 of the original game and 
one for period 1 of the restart game.  Thus we include the individual dummies and random 
effects. 
  Identical regressions without the individual dummy variables yield similar results (the period 1 
coefficient on GUESS is .192, p < .01, the period 10 coefficient on GUESS is .184, p < .01).  
Identical regressions run for each of the games separately on period 1 play also yield similar 
results (for the original game, the period 1 coefficient on GUESS is .215, p < .01 and for the 
restart game, the same coefficient is .313, p < .01). 
 
A similar test excluding the observations of zero correlation was also run.  The null hypothesis 
of equal number of positive and negative correlations was rejected at p<.01. 
 
The hypothesis that the mean of the distribution of errors in the first game is equal to zero can be 
rejected using a t-test at the 5% level for eight out of 24 subjects.   It cannot be rejected for any 
subjects in the second game. 
 
A similar test excluding the observations of zero contributions was also run.  The null 
hypothesis of equal number of positive and negative correlations was rejected at p<.01 for all 
four treatments as well as the combined data. 
 
Remember that Sugden’s notion of reciprocity is a simultaneous rather than a sequential one.  
It’s not that subjects in this experiment are “rewarding” their group members for past 
performance.  Instead, they are trying to “match” the contributions they expect of others in 
their group. 
 
Notice it is quite possible for an individual’s contribution to be above the maximum (or 
below the minimum) of the other three members of his group.  In fact, the contributions one 
person in each group in each period will have this characteristic. 
 
A more recent example of reciprocal behavior is found in the entertainment industry.  
During the making of Titanic, when the film was running over budget and failed to make the 
planned release date, director James Cameron voluntarily gave up fees for the film as well as 
his percentage of the profits in order to assuage concerns of executives at Twentieth Century 
Fox and Paramount Picture Studios.  Now that Titanic is the third-biggest grossing film of 
all time, those waived fees and percentages total to approximately $50 million.  A report in 
Newsweek (1998) says that studio heads are now considering voluntarily and unilaterally 
paying Cameron the very fees he had agreed to waive. 
 
